sábado, 14 de abril de 2012

Misery Index


Low social status is bad for your health. Biologists are starting to understand why

ONCE upon a time the overstressed executive bellowing orders into a telephone, cancelling meetings, staying late at the office and dying of a heart attack was a stereotype of modernity. That was before the Whitehall studies, a series of investigations of British civil servants begun in the 1960s. These studies found that the truth is precisely the opposite. Those at the top of the pecking order actually have the least stressful and most healthy lives. Cardiac arrest—and, indeed, early death from any cause—is the prerogative of underlings.
Such results have since been confirmed many times, both in human societies and in other primate species with strong social hierarchies. But whereas the pattern is well-understood, the biological mechanisms underlying it are not. A study just published in theProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, however, sheds some light on the matter.
In it, a group of researchers led by Jenny Tung and Yoav Gilad at the University of Chicago looked at the effects of status on rhesus macaques. Experience has shown that these monkeys display the simian equivalent of the Whitehall studies’ findings. The high risk of disease among those at the bottom of the heap in both cases suggests that biochemical responses to low status affect a creature’s immune system. Those responses must, in turn, depend on changes in the way the creatures’ genes are expressed. To investigate this phenomenon means manipulating social hierarchies, but that would be hard (and probably unethical) if it were done to human beings. You can, however, do it to monkeys, and the researchers did.
Unhappy minds in unhealthy bodies
Dr Tung and Dr Gilad took 49 middle-ranking female macaques (females were chosen because a lot of previous work on animal hierarchies has been done on female macaques) and split them into groups of four or five. The researchers were able to control where in a group an individual ranked by the order in which it was introduced into its group (newly introduced monkeys almost always adopt a role subordinate to existing group members). The hierarchies thus established, the team conducted tests on cells in the monkeys’ blood, in an attempt to determine the effect of a macaque’s rank on her biochemistry and, in particular, on how rank influences the activity of various genes.
The answer is, a lot. Dr Tung and Dr Gilad looked at the expression in each animal of 6,097 genes (30% of the total number in a monkey genome—or, for that matter, in a human one). They were searching for correlations between social rank and gene activity, and in 987 genes they found one. Some genes were more active in high-ranking individuals; others were more active in low-ranking ones. The relationship was robust enough to work the other way round, too. Given a blood sample and no other information, it was possible to predict an individual’s status within her group with an accuracy of 80%.
The next question was what all these genes actually do. Sure enough the answer, for a substantial fraction of them, was that they regulate aspects of the immune system. In particular, low-status individuals showed high levels of activity in genes associated with the production of various immune-related cells and chemical signalling factors, as well as those to do with inflammation (a general immune response that involves tissue swelling and increased immune-cell activity in the affected area). Although the researchers did not explicitly examine the health of their simian charges, chronic, generalised inflammation is a risk factor, in people, for a long list of ailments ranging from heart trouble to Alzheimer’s disease.
Finally, the team investigated the mechanisms behind these differences in gene expression. In keeping with previous work, they found that high- and low-rank individuals showed different levels of responsiveness to a class of hormones called glucocorticoids, which regulate immune-system activity and response to stress. They also found changes in the mix of cells within the animals’ immune system itself. But what is new, and intriguing, is that they discovered, for the first time, evidence that a phenomenon called epigenetic change is at work.
Epigenetics—currently one of molecular biology’s hottest topics—is a process by which genes are activated or deactivated by the presence or absence of chemical structures called methyl and acetyl groups. Dr Tung and Dr Gilad found that methylation patterns were systematically different in high- and low-ranking animals. Crucially, these changes are generally passed on to the daughter cells produced when a cell divides, and are thus perpetuated throughout an animal’s life. To the extent that epigenetic marking is involved in creating social status, then, status may be being maintained by the animal’s cells as they replicate.
Destiny’s child?
Those who believe in progress will, however, be pleased to know that epigenetics is not necessarily destiny. Methyl groups may help maintain the status quo, but if that status quo is interrupted by outside events they can be wiped away and a new lot put in place.
Dr Tung and Dr Gilad discovered this because a few of their monkeys did change status within their groups. When that happened, changes in gene expression appropriate to the new status quickly followed. Those who do break free from their lowly station, then, may begin to reap the health benefits almost immediately.
As with any animal study, this one cannot simply be mapped straight onto humans. But it does provide pointers that researchers who work on people can use. In particular, the experiment ensured that social rank was the only factor being changed, providing strong evidence that the chain of causality runs from low social status, through a disrupted immune system to worse health, and not the other way around. The best medicine, then, is promotion. Prosper, and live long.

Reporte Angelides

EL REPORTE ANGELIDES
Humberto Hernández Haddad
Harvard

El documento oficial “Reporte Final de la Comisión Investigadora sobre la Crisis Financiera en los Estados Unidos” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission) fue entregado en enero de 2011 al Presidente y al Congreso de los Estados Unidos, con los hallazgos y recomendaciones obtenidos después de 18 meses de investigación.

A lo largo de sus 545 páginas, los diez miembros de esa Comisión exponen sus conclusiones sobre las causas y los causantes del asombroso quebranto financiero que derritió el sistema bancario de los Estados Unidos con efectos globales de contagio tóxico. (“The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report”, Editorial Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group, enero de 2011).

Analistas financieros estadounidenses lo bautizaron como el Reporte Angelides, por ser Phil Angelides el presidente de esa Comisión Federal independiente investigadora, compuesta por 6 demócratas y 4 republicanos, creada en mayo de 2009 mediante decreto del Presidente de los Estados Unidos, con la aprobación del Congreso de Washington, para examinar por mandato estatutario una agenda de 22 temas que subyacen detrás del colapso de varias instituciones financieras de los Estados Unidos. Todo esto en cumplimiento de la ley federal Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, complementaria de la ley federal Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) que es otro brazo indagatorio a cargo de un panel de investigación del propio Congreso de Washington, dotado de un Inspector General Especial.

En el curso de esa investigación fueron citados a declarar más de 700 testigos. Comparecieron representantes no solo de los gigantes financieros en crisis, sino también los directivos de la Reserva Federal, el Departamento del Tesoro y la Comisión Bancaria y de Valores, entre otras agencias regulatorias federales en cuyas esferas de responsabilidad descansaba la supervisión directa de las actividades financieras que inexplicablemente nunca detectaron o sospecharon que fueran irregulares.

Los datos que aportan son contundentes: “Al cierre de este Reporte más de 26 millones de estadounidenses se encuentran sin trabajo, cerca de 4 millones de familias han perdido sus casas en remates y otras cuatro y medio millones han escapado al remate de sus casas pero se encuentran atrasados en el pago de sus hipotecas. Cerca de 11 millones de millones de dólares en capital inmobiliario se han esfumado… El impacto de esta crisis lo resentirá una generación, sin tener a la vista un camino fácil para recuperar el vigor económico.”

Los Comisionados explican que se plantearon esta pregunta fundamental: “¿Cómo fue posible que en el 2008 los Estados Unidos se viera forzado a escoger entre dos alternativas, -igualmente dolorosas-, entre el riesgo de un colapso total de la economía y del sistema financiero, o inyectar millones de millones de dólares al sistema financiero y a un grupo de compañías, mientras millones de estadounidenses perdían sus trabajos, sus ahorros y sus casas?”

Un aspecto de ese dilema se explica en los cambios que experimentó el sistema financiero estadounidense, que lo llevaron a convertirse en la fuerza dominante de la economía de ese país. Por ejemplo, la deuda en poder del sistema financiero creció de 3 millones de millones de dólares en 1987 a 36 millones de millones de dólares en 2007. Las firmas de Wall Street pasaron de ser sociedades privadas en su mayoría, a transformarse en corporaciones con accionistas bursátiles tomando riesgos más altos y complejos. En el 2006, las utilidades del sector financiero constituían 27% de todas las utilidades corporativas de los Estados Unidos, comparado con 15% que representaban en 1980.

La Comisión concluye que esta crisis podía haberse evitado, que es resultado de la acción humana y de omisiones por parte de los entes regulatorios que fallaron en su tarea supervisora y con ello devastaron la estabilidad del sistema financiero de los Estados Unidos. También jugó un papel importante la combinación de préstamos excesivos, inversiones riesgosas y falta de transparencia, que pusieron al sistema en curso de colisión con el hecho de que el gobierno de ese país no estaba preparado para esa crisis que los sumió en una profunda recesión.

Los Comisionados identifican otros actores contribuyentes de esa catástrofe como los instrumentos especulativos sintéticos de derivados financieros, sumado con la falla de las tres agencias calificadoras de riesgo crediticio, a las cuales acusan de ser: “facilitadores claves del derretimiento financiero”. El Reporte advierte que mientras no se corrijan las fallas y omisiones del marco regulatorio del sistema financiero ese tipo de crisis puede repetirse con consecuencias catastróficas de mayor profundidad y costo que las que hemos visto hasta ahora.

Leyendo el Reporte Angelides, se puede entender el papel que juegan ciertos grupos financieros internacionales, como fue el BCCI, en la captura de los entes regulatorios, con el riesgo de que puedan llegar a colapsar no solo a la economía sino también a las instituciones políticas, empujando países a la condición de Estado fallido, por falta de legalidad, transparencia y rendición de cuentas. Por ello, es urgente que México proponga al gobierno de Estados Unidos la instalación de una “Comisión Binacional de Investigación sobre las Causas de la Violencia del Narcotráfico en México”, integrada por expertos de ambos países, con participación de los dos Congresos, para que en un plazo determinado entregue sus resultados a los dos gobiernos.

Ahí saldrían a la luz los nombres de quiénes crearon desde los círculos financieros, empresariales y políticos de la narco-economía internacional la ola de violencia que tiene sumido a México en una crisis que asombra a todo el mundo.

Mientras más se retrase esa investigación binacional, más difícil de reparar será la tragedia socio-económica que causaron en México.

Abogado por la UNAM, fue Diputado Federal, Senador de la República y Cónsul General de México en Estados Unidos.

The War is not over


Europe’s future is not up to the Bundesbank


Far from abating, the euro crisis has recently taken a turn for the worse. The European Central Bank relieved an incipient credit crunch through its longer-term refinancing operations. The resulting rally in financial markets hid an underlying deterioration; but that is unlikely to last much longer.

The fundamental problems have not been resolved; indeed, the gap between creditor and debtor countries continues to widen. The crisis has entered what may be a less volatile but more lethal phase.

At the onset of the crisis, the eurozone’s break-up was inconceivable: assets and liabilities denominated in the common currency were so intermingled that it would have caused an uncontrollable meltdown. But, as the crisis has progressed, the eurozone has been reoriented along national lines.

The LTRO enabled Spanish and Italian banks to engage in very profitable and low-risk arbitrage in their own countries’ bonds. And the preferential treatment received by the ECB on its Greek bonds will discourage other investors from holding sovereign debt. If this continues for a few more years, a eurozone break-up would become possible without a meltdown – but would leave creditor countries’ central banks holding big claims that would be hard to enforce against debtor countries’ central banks.

The Bundesbank has seen the danger. It is now campaigning against the indefinite expansion of the money supply, and it has started taking measures to limit the losses it would sustain in a break-up. This is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: once the Bundesbank starts guarding against a break-up, everybody will have to do the same. Markets are beginning to reflect this.

The Bundesbank is also tightening credit at home. This would be the right policy if Germany was a freestanding country, but the eurozone’s heavily indebted members badly need stronger demand from Germany to avoid recession. Without it, the eurozone’s fiscal compact, agreed last December, cannot possibly work. The heavily indebted countries will either fail to implement the necessary measures or, if they do, they will fail to meet their targets because of collapsing demand. Either way, debt ratios will rise, and the competitiveness gap with Germany will widen.

Whether or not the euro endures, Europe is facing a long period of economic stagnation or worse. Other countries have gone through similar experiences. Latin American countries suffered a lost decade after 1982, and Japan has been stagnating for a quarter of a century; both have survived. But the European Union is not a country and it is unlikely to survive. The deflationary debt trap threatens to destroy a still-incomplete political union.

The only way to escape the trap is to recognise that current policies are counterproductive and change course. I cannot propose a cut-and-dried plan, only some guidelines. First, the rules governing the eurozone have failed and need radical revision. Defending a status quo that is unworkable only makes matters worse. Second, the current situation is highly anomalous, and exceptional measures are needed to restore normality. Finally, new rules must allow for financial markets’ inherent instability.

To be realistic, the fiscal compact must be the starting point, although some obvious defects will need to be modified. The compact should count commercial as well as financial debts and budgets should distinguish between investments that pay and current spending. To avoid cheating, what qualifies as investment should be subject to approval by a European authority. An enlarged European Investment Bank could then co-finance investments.

Most important, some new, extraordinary measures are needed to return conditions to normal. The EU’s fiscal charter compels member states to reduce their public debt annually by one-twentieth of the amount by which they exceed 60 per cent of gross domestic product. I propose that member states jointly reward good behaviour by taking over that obligation. They have transferred to the ECB their seignorage rights, valued at €2tn-€3tn by Willem Buiter of Citibank and Huw Pill of Goldman Sachs, working independently. A special-purpose vehicle owning the rights could use the ECB to finance the cost of acquiring the bonds without violating Article 123 of the Lisbon treaty.

Should a country violate the fiscal compact, it would be obliged to pay interest on all or part of the debt owned by the SPV. That would surely impose tough fiscal discipline.

By rewarding good behaviour, the fiscal compact would no longer constitute a deflationary debt trap. The outlook would radically improve. In addition, to narrow the competitiveness gap, all members should be able to refinance existing debt at the same interest rate. But that would require greater fiscal integration. It would have to be phased in gradually.

The Bundesbank will never accept these proposals, but the European authorities ought to take them seriously. The future of Europe is a political issue: it is beyond the Bundesbank’s competence to decide.

Source: Financial Times